Jonathan Edwards · 287 of 409

CHAPTER V. Of Satisfaction for Sin · Part 3

And the greater that desire appears,-the more earnestly he seeks the other’s welfare, and the greater things he does to obtain it; so much the more does his interest become his own, and so much the more does he substitute himself in the room of the other.

6. Especially is the client’s welfare properly and naturally regarded, for the sake of the patron that is very dear and worthy in the eyes of any person, when the way in which the patron expresses the desire of the client’s welfare, that he is closely united to, and in which he seeks it, is by suffering and being at expense of his own personal and private welfare in any degree, for the welfare of the client. Expending one’s good or interest for another, is properly transferring the interest in the good expended, into the good sought: the expended good, which is the means, is properly set aside and removed, in the regard of him that is at the expense, and whose regard is placed on that good which is the end. The good of the price is parted with, for the good of the thing purchased; and therefore, here is proper substitution of one in the place of the other.

In such a case therefore, in a more special manner, will it be proper and natural for one in whose eyes the patron is very worthy, and to whom he is very dear, to have regard to the welfare of the client for the patron’s sake, or for the sake of the patron’s merit: as, suppose the client of the excellent and dear patron be a child or spouse in captivity, and the patron lays out himself exceedingly for the client s redemption, and goes through many and very great hardships, and is at vast expense for the obtaining of it.

7. If the patron who seeks the welfare of the client, in his seeking of it, does particularly and directly apply himself to the person who has so high an esteem and affection for him, expressing his desires of the client’s welfare in request to him, and the endeavours that are used with him, and what is expended for the client’s welfare be given to him, expended for him, for his sake, promoting his ends, or for something that his friend regards as his own interest; then especially is it natural that the person, of whom his client’s welfare is sought, should be ready to grant it for his sake.

8. It is still more highly proper and natural to regard the client’s welfare on account of the patron’s merit, or to reckon the merit of the patron to his client’s account; if the merit of the patron consists, or especially appears, in what he does for his client’s welfare; or if the virtues and worthy qualities have their chief exercise, and do chiefly exhibit their amiableness, in those excellent and amiable acts which he performs in seeking the good of the client, in the deeds he performs on the account of the interest of the client, and in his applying to his friends for it; in the acts he performs as an intercessor with his friend for it, and the service he does him on this account. In this case, it is peculiarly natural to accept the client, on the account of the merit of the patron; for the merit is on his account, and has its existence for the sake of the client.

9. More especially is it natural, when his merit, above all, consists and appears in the very expense the patron is at of his own welfare, for the welfare of the client, or in the act of expending or exchanging the one for the other. For, as was observed before, such expense is properly regarded as a price of the client’s welfare; but when such merit is added to the price, this merit becomes the worth, value, or preciousness of the price; preciousness of another kind, besides merely the value of the natural good parted with. It adds a moral good to the price, equal to the natural good expended; so that the worthiness of the patron, and the value expended, are offered both together in one, as the price of the welfare of the client.

10. The thus accepting the patron’s merit, as being placed to the account of the client, will be more natural still, if the patron puts himself in the place of that client, undertaking to appear for him, to represent him, and act in his stead by an exceeding great change in his circumstances, clothes himself with the form of his client, goes where he is, takes his place in the universe, puts himself into his circumstances, and is in all things made like unto him, wherein this may be consistent with maintaining his merit inviolable. If the client be unworthy, and an offender, and has deserved ill of the person whose favour he needs, then abating and dismissing resentment, or lessening or withholding the evil deserved, for the sake of the merit of the patron, is equivalent to a positive favour for his sake, in case of no offence and demerit of punishment.

11. If the person that needs favour be an offender and unworthy, then, in order to a proper influence and effect of the union and merit of a patron, to induce his friend to receive him into favour on his account, the union of the patron with his client, and his undertaking and appearing as his patron to seek favour for him, should be in such a manner, and attended with such circumstances, as not to diminish his merit, i. e. so as that his union with and intercession for the client, shall not in the least infringe on these two things, vis. the patron’s own union with his friend, whose favour he seeks for the client, and his merit strictly so called, i. e. his own virtue. For if his own worthiness be diminished by his union with one that is unworthy, then his influence to recommend the client one way, is destroyed one way, at the same time that it is established another. For the recommending influence consists in the two things, viz. his merit, and his union with the client. Therefore, if one of these is diminished or destroyed, as the other is advanced and established; nothing is done on the whole toward recommending the client. Therefore, in order that, on the whole, the client be effectually recommended, it is necessary that the patron’s union to an offending unworthy client should be attended with such circumstances, that it shall not be at all consistent with these two things, his regard to his friend, and his regard to virtue or holiness: for in these two things consists his merit in the eyes of his friend; and therefore it is necessary, that his appearing united to his unworthy and offending client should be with such circumstances as most plainly to demonstrate, that he perfectly disapproves of his offence and unworthiness, and to show a perfect regard to virtue, and to the honour and dignity of his offended injured friend. There is no way that this can be so thoroughly and fully done, as by undertaking himself to pay the debt to the honour and rights of his injured friend, and to honour the rule of virtue and righteousness the client has violated, by putting himself in the stead of the offender, into subjection to the injured rights and violated authority of his offended friend, and under the violated law and rule of righteousness belonging to one in the client’s state; and so, for the sake of the honour of his friend’s authority, and the rule of righteousness, suffering the whole penalty due to the offender, and which would have been requisite to be suffered by him, for the maintaining the honour and dignity of those things; and himself, by such great condescension, and under such self-denial, honouring those rights and rules by his obedience and perfect conformity to them; hereby giving the most evident testimony to all beholders, that although he loves his client and seeks his welfare, yet he had rather be humbled so low, deny himself so greatly, and suffer so much, than that his welfare should be in the least diminished, his authority weakened, and his honour and his dignity degraded.

12. If the patron be, in the eyes of him whose favour is sought, of very great dignity, it is agreeable to reason and nature that this should have influence to procure greater favour to the client than if he were of less dignity. And when it is inquired, whether there be a sufficiency in the patron and his relation to his client, to answer such a degree of favour as is proposed to be obtained for him; the dignity of the patron is one thing that is to be estimated and put into the scales, with the degree of favour sought, in order to know whether it be sufficient to countervail it. By dignity, I here intend, not only the degree of virtue and relation to his friend, of whom he seeks favour, but the greatness of the person of the patron.

If, in adjusting this matter, the dignity that is viewed in the patron, and his friend’s regard to him, be so great, that, considered with the degree of the patron’s union with his client, there is a sufficiency to countervail all the favour that the client needs, or the utmost that he is capable of receiving, then there is a perfect sufficiency in the patron for the client, or a sufficiency completely to answer and support the whole interest of the client; or a sufficiency in his friend’s regard to the patron, wholly to receive, take in, and comprehend the client, with regard to his whole interest, or all that pertains to his welfare; or, which is the same thing, a sufficiency fully to answer for him as his representative and substitute, in all that pertains to his welfare.

13. If the patron and client are equals as to greatness of being or degree of existence, and the degree of the patron’s union with his client should be such (and that were possible) that he regarded the interest of the client equally with his own personal interest; then it would be natural for the patron s friend to regard the client’s welfare for the sake of the patron, as much as he regards the patron’s own personal welfare: because, when the case is so, the patron is as strictly united to the client as he is to himself, and his client’s welfare becomes perfectly, and to all intents and purposes, his own interest, as much as his personal welfare; and therefore, as the love of his friend to him disposes him to regard whatever is his interest, to such a degree as it is his interest; so it must dispose him to regard the client’s welfare in an equal degree with his own personal interest; because, by the supposition, it is his interest in an equal degree. But this must be here provided or supposed, viz. not only that so strict a union of the patron and client be possible, but also that it be proper, or that there be no impropriety or unfitness in it; because if it be unfit, then the patron’s being so strictly united to him, diminishes his merit; because merit, at least in part, consists in a regard to what is proper and fit; and if the degree of union be unfit, it diminishes the influence of that union to recommend the client one way, as much as it increases it another.

14. If the patron and client are not equals, but the patron be greater and vastly superior as to rank and degree of existence, it gives greater weight to his union, as to its influence with the friend of the patron, to recommend the client; so that a less degree of union of the patron with the client may be equivalent to a greater union, in case of equality. Therefore, in this case, though the union be not so great as that his regard to the client’s interest should be equal with his own personal interest, but may be much less, yet his regard to it may be such, that its recommending influence may be equivalent to that which is fully equal in the case of equality of persons; and therefore may be sufficient to answer the same purposes towards the client, and consequently to be perfectly sufficient for the client, with regard to the client’s whole interest.

15. From these things, we may gather this as a rule whereby to judge, whether there be a sufficiency in the patron’s union with his client, to answer for the whole interest of the client with the patron’s friend, with respect to the degree of union of the patron, and the degree of greatness where there is no defect of merit in other respects, vis. that the patron’s union with the client shall be such, that considering jointly both the degree of greatness, and degree of union, the patron’s union with his client shall be as considerable and weighty, and have as much recommending influence, as if, in case of equality of the patron with his client, the union between them was so great, that the patron’s regard to the welfare of the client were equal to his own.

16. Then the union of the patron has its measure and proportion according to the rule now mentioned, and so is sufficient to answer his whole interest; when the degree of his regard to his client’s interest stands in the same proportion to his regard to his own personal interest, as the degree of the capacity of the client stands in to the degree of his own capacity; for the degrees of capacity are as the greatness or the degrees of existence of the person.

17. When the patron’s regard to his client is thus proportioned, that is, when he regards the client’s interest as his own, according to the client’s capacity, then such a union may most fitly and aptly be represented, by the client’s being taken by the patron to be as a part or member of himself, as though he were a member of his body. For men love each part of themselves as themselves, but yet not each part equally with themselves; but each part as themselves, according to the measure of the capacity of the part. A man loves his little finger as himself, but not equally with the head; but yet with the same love he bears to himself, according to the place, measure, and capacity of the little finger.

18. The most proper and plain trial and demonstration of this sufficiency of union of the patron with the client, consisting in such a proportion of regard to his welfare as has been mentioned, is the patron’s being willing to bear sufferings for the client, or in his stead, that are equivalent to sufferings which properly belong to the latter; which equivalence of sufferings must be determined by a joint estimation of these two things, viz. the degree of suffering, and the greatness of the sufferer. When the effect of the patron’s love to the client is a suffering for the client that is equal in value or weight to the client’s suffering, considering the difference of the degree of persons; it shows, that the love to the client, which is the cause of this suffering, is also equal or equivalent to his love for himself, according to the different degree of the persons.

The most proper and clear trial of the measure of love or regard to the interest of another, is the measure of suffering, or expense of personal interest, for the interest of the beloved. So much as the lover regards the welfare of the beloved, so much in value or weight of his own welfare, will he be willing to part with for it. If the value of the welfare obtained, be, in the regard of the sufferer, fully equal to the value of the welfare parted with, then, there being an equal balance, no preponderation of self-love will hinder parting with one for the other. The love therefore is sufficient and equal to self-love, allowing only for the difference of capacity or greatness of the persons; as the sufferings are equal, allowing for the same difference of the degree of persons.

19. There can be but one thing more requisite, according to the nature of things, in order to its being to all intents and purposes proper and suitable that the patron should be accepted as one with the client, in what pertains to the client’s interest, and his merits being imputed to the client, and his having favour on the account of it; which is this, that seeing the client is an intelligent being, capable of act and choice, he should therefore actively and cordially concur in the affair; that the union between the patron and him should be mutual; that as the patron’s heart is united to the client, so the client’s heart should be united to the patron; that as there is that disposition and those acts appearing in the patron that are proper to the character and relation of a patron, in undertaking for the client to appear for him before his friend, as his representative, guardian, deliverer, and saviour, and condescending to him to do and suffer all for him needful for his help and advancement; so there must also appear in the client those dispositions and acts that are proper to the character and relation of a client, cleaving to him, committing his cause to him, and trusting in him, in an entire approbation of the patron’s friendship, kind under-taking, and patronage: and not only an approbation of the patron’s union to him, by which he avails for his being looked upon as one with him, but also of the patron’s union to his friend, whose favour he seeks, which union with his friend avails to the acceptance of the patron; and also an entire approbation of the benefits which the patron seeks of his friend for the client; or, in one word, a cordial and entire faith of the client in his patron. When there is thus a mutual union between the patron and client, and a union throughout between them both, and the friend whose favour is sought, together with those things before mentioned, there is every thing requisite in order to the fitness of the acceptance of the client on the account of the patron, and his receiving such favour from the patron’s friend, as is requisite to all that pertains to the client’s welfare; so that such acceptance and such favour shall be in all respects proper, according to the nature of things, and common sense of intelligent beings, and of no evil or improper consequence.

§ 4. “Besides the dignity of Christ’s sufferings directly arising from the dignity of his person, there is another consideration, by which the value of our Saviour’s sufferings ought to be estimated. As an indignity is always rated by the presumption, and as the presumption bears an exact proportion to the meanness of the person insulting, and to the greatness of the party insulted; so, in like manner, all acts of condescension are estimated by the humility, and that again by the dignity, of the condescending person, and by the lowness and demerit of the party condescended to.” Deism Revealed, edit. 2. vol. i. p. 252, 253.

§ 5. “It were (as an excellent writer has expressed it) manifestly more honourable and worthy of God, not to have exacted any recompence at all, than to have accepted, in the name of a sacrifice, such as were unproportionable, and beneath the value of what was to be remitted and conferred. What had been lower, must have been infinitely lower. Let any thing be supposed less than God, and it falls immensely short of him. Such is the distance between created being and uncreated, that the former is as nothing to the latter. And therefore, bring the honour and majesty of the Deity to any thing less than an equal value, and you bring it to nothing. And this had been quite to lose the design of insisting upon a recompence: it had been to make the majesty of heaven cheap, and depreciate the dignity of the divine government, instead of rendering it august and great.” Rawlin on Justification, p. 104, 105.

§ 6. It is said, that God is not obliged to fulfil his threatenings of punishment of sin. Not to dispute about the import of the word obliged, let it be considered, whether it is not fit that God should fulfil his threatenings. If any answer, no; then I would inquire further, whether the fitness of things does not require that God should pay some regard to his threatenings that belong to his law as its sanction; whether the law with its sanctions be not published or exhibited, that his subjects may view it as a rule of proceeding between the Lawgiver and his subjects; and whether it can have the influence intended, or indeed any significancy, if it be not understood as such in some measure. Therefore, if it be not fit that God should act impertinently and insignificantly, it surely is fit that some regard should be paid to the law, not only in the actions of the subject, but also in the proceedings of the Judge. And if it be fit that some regard should be paid to it, how great a regard? If the rule may be set aside and departed from in one instance, why not in two? and why not in four? where are the limits? The threatenings are no farther sanctions, than they are supposed to be declarations of truth. Therefore is it not fit that the threatenings of the law should be neglected. Truth is a thing which should always attend them in an inviolable manner. If God has reserved to himself the liberty of departing from the rule at his pleasure, without any signification beforehand, or any reason given to determine what his pleasure will be; then, how can the subject know but that he will always depart from it?

§ 7. Texts taken from Rawlin on justification, which show that the holiness and justice of God insist on sin’s being punished. Levit. x. 3. “Then Moses said unto Aaron, This is it that the Lord spake, saying, I will be sanctified in them that come nigh me, and before all the people I will be glorified.” Psal. xi. 6, 7. “Upon the wicked he shall rain snares, fire, and brimstone, and a horrible tempest; this shall be the portion of their cup. For the righteous Lord loveth righteousness: his countenance doth behold the upright.” Exodus xxxiv. 7. “Keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity, and transgression, and sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty; visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children’s children, unto the third and to the fourth generation.” Job xxxiv. 10,11. “Therefore hearken unto me, ye men of understanding. Far be it from God that he should do wickedness, and from the Almighty that he should commit iniquity. For the work of a man shall he render unto him, and cause every man to find according to his ways.” Job x. 14. “If I sin, then thou makest me, and thou wilt not acquit me from mine iniquity.” Chapter vii. 20. “I have sinned, what shall I do unto thee, O thou preserver of men? Why hast thou set me as a mark against thee, so that I am a burden to myself?” Joshua xxiv. 19. “And Joshua said unto the people, Ye cannot serve the Lord; for he is a holy God; he is a jealous God; he will not forgive your transgressions nor your sins.”

§ 8. It was needful, that he that was a Mediator between two parties, that are distant and alienated one from the other, to be the middle person to unite them together, should himself be united to both. Otherwise he could not, by coming between them, be a bond of union between them. And if he be a Mediator between God and guilty men, it was necessary that he should unite himself to them, or assume them as it were to himself. But if he unites himself to guilty creatures, he of necessity brings their guilt on himself. If he unites himself to them that are in debt, he brings their debt on himself. He cannot properly unite himself to a rebel against God, and one that is obnoxious to God’s wrath, and is condemned to condign punishment, to be a Mediator to bring God to be at peace with him, without voluntarily taking his sufferings on himself; because otherwise his undertaking for such a one, and uniting himself to such a one, will appear like countenancing his offence and rebellion. But if at the same time that he unites himself to him, he takes it upon himself to bear his penalty, it quite takes off all such appearance. He shows, that though he loves the rebel that has affronted the Divine Majesty, yet he at the same time has the greatest possible abhorrence of the injury to God’s majesty, and dishonour to his name, in that he regards the honour of God’s majesty so much as to be willing to endure so extreme sufferings, that the divine glory and majesty may not be injured, but fully maintained.

§ 9. Christ suffered the wrath of God for men’s sins in such a way as he was capable of, being an infinitely holy person, who knew that God was not angry with him personally, knew that God did not hate him, but infinitely loved him. The wicked in hell will suffer the wrath of God, as they will have the sense, and knowledge, and sight of God’s infinite displeasure towards them and hatred of them. But this was impossible in Jesus Christ. Christ therefore could bear the wrath of God in no other but these two ways.

I. In having a great and clear sight of the infinite wrath of God against the sin of men, and the punishment they had deserved. This it was. most fit that he should have, at the time when he was suffering in their stead, and paying their ransom to deliver them from that wrath and punishment. That he might know what he did, that he might act with full understanding at the time when he made expiation and paid a ransom for sinners to redeem them from hell, first, It was requisite that at that time he should have a clear sight of two things, viz. of the dreadful evil and odiousness of that sin that he suffered for, that he might know how much it deserved the punishment; that it might be real and actual grace in him, that he undertook and suffered such things for those that were so unworthy and so hateful; which it could not be, if he did not know how unworthy they were. Secondly, It was requisite he should have a clear sight of the dreadfulness of the punishment that he suffered to deliver them from, otherwise he would not know how great a benefit he vouchsafed them in redeeming them from this punishment; and so it could not be actual grace in him to bestow so great a benefit upon them; as, in the time that he bestowed, he would not have known how much he bestowed; he would have acted blindfold in giving so much. Therefore Christ, doubtless, actually had a clear view of both those things in the time of his last suffering: every thing in the circumstances of his last suffering concurred to give him a great and full sight of the former, viz. the evil and hateful nature of the sin of man. For its odious and malignant nature never appeared so much in its own proper colours, as it did in that act of murdering the Son of God, and in exercising such contempt and cruelty towards him. Likewise, every thing in the circumstances of his last sufferings tended to give him a striking view of the dreadful punishment of sin. The sight of the evil of sin tended to this, and so did the enduring of temporal death, that is a great image of eternal death, especially under such circumstances, with such extreme pain, God’s hiding his face, his dying a death that by God’s appointment was an accursed death, having a sight of the malice and triumph of devils, and being forsaken of his friends, &c. As God ordered external circumstances to help forward this purpose; so, there is all reason to think, that his own influences on Christ’s mind were agreeable hereto, his spirit acting with his providence to give him a full view of these things. Now the clear view of each of these must of necessity be inexpressibly terrible to the man Christ Jesus. His having so clear an actual view of sin and its hateful-ness, was an idea infinitely disagreeable to the holy nature of Christ; and therefore, unless balanced with an equal sight of good that comes by this evil, must have been an immensely disagreeable sensation in Christ’s soul, or, which is the same thing, immense suffering. But that equally clear idea of good, to counterbalance the evil of sin, was not given at that time; because God forsook Christ, and hid himself from him, and withheld comfortable influences, or the clear ideas of pleasant objects. Thus, Christ bare our sins; God laid on him the iniquities of us all, and he bare the burden of them; and so, his bearing the burden of our sins may be considered as something diverse from his suffering God’s wrath. For his suffering wrath consisted more in the sense he had of the other thing, viz. the dreadfulness of the punishment of sin, or the dreadfulness of God’s wrath inflicted for it. Thus, Christ was tormented not only in the fire of God’s wrath, but in the fire of our sins; and our sins were his tormentors; the evil and malignant nature of sin, was what Christ endured immediately, as well as more remotely, in bearing the consequences of it.