Jonathan Edwards · 286 of 409

CHAPTER V. Of Satisfaction for Sin · Part 2

But I have already shown how every departure from it weakens it, unfixes it, and causes it to fail of the nature of a settled rule, and in some measure disannuls it.

4th. The sacredness of the authority and majesty of the Divine Lawgiver requires, that he should maintain and fulfil his law, when it is violated by a rebellious subject. I have before spoken of the greatness and majesty of his being, how that is concerned in it. I now would consider the sacredness of his authority, as he stands related to his creatures as their lawgiver. “The majesty of a ruler consists very much in that which appears in him; that tends to strike the subject with reverence and awe, and dread of contempt of him, or rebellion against him. And it is fit that this awe and dread should be in proportion to the greatness and dignity of the ruler, and the degree of authority with which he is vested. But this awe and dread is by an apprehension of the terribleness of the consequences of that contempt and rebellion, and the degree of the danger of those terrible consequences, or the degree of connexion of that rebellion with those consequences. Therefore, if it be meet that this awe or this apprehension should be in proportion to the greatness and dignity of the ruler, then it is fit that the consequences of contempt of the Supreme Ruler of the world should he infinitely terrible, and the danger that it brings of punishment, or connexion that it has with it, be strong and certain, and consequently, that the threatenings which enforce his laws should be sure and inviolable. It is fit the authority of a ruler should be sacred proportionably to the greatness of that authority, i. e. in proportion to the greatness of the ruler, and his worthiness of honour and obedience, and the height of his exaltation above us, and the absoluteness of his dominion over us, and the strength of his right to our submission and obedience. But the sacredness of the authority of a sovereign consists in the strength of the enforcement of it, and guard that is about it, i. e. in the consequences of the violation to him that is guilty, and the degree of danger of these consequences. For the authority of a ruler does not consist in the power or influence he has on another by attractives, but coercives. The fence that is about the authority of a prince, that guards it as sacred, is the connexion there is between the violations of it, and the terrible consequences; or, in other words, in the strength or sureness of the threatening. Therefore, if this connexion be partly broken, the fence is partly broken: in proportion as the threatenings are weak, the guard is weak. But certainly it is fit that the authority of the infinitely great and absolute Lord of heaven and earth should be infinitely sacred, and should he kept so with an infinitely strong guard, and a fence without any breach in it. And it is not becoming the sacredness of the majesty and authority of the great Greek, that that perfectly holy, just, and infinitely wise and good law, which he has established a the great rule for the regulation of all things in the universal commonwealth of beings, should be set aside, to give place to the infinitely unreasonable and vile opposition that sinners make to it, and their horrid and daring rebellion against it.

5th. The truth of the lawgiver makes it necessary that the threatening of the law should be fulfilled in every punctilio. The threatening of the law is absolute: Thou shall surely die. It is true, the obligation does not lie in the claim of the person threatened, as it is in promises: for it is not to be supposed, that the person threatened will claim the punishment threatened. And indeed, if we look upon things strictly, those seem to reckon the wrong way, that suppose the necessity of the futurity of the execution to arise from an obligation on God in executing, properly consequent on his threatening. For the necessity of the connexion of the execution with the threatening, seems to arise directly the other way, viz. from the obligation that was on the omniscient God in threatening, consequent on the futurity of the execution. Though, strictly speaking, he is not obliged to execute because he has threatened, yet he was obliged not absolutely to threaten, if he at the same time knew that he should not and would not execute; because this would not have been consistent with his truth. So that, from the truth of God, there is an inviolable connexion between absolute threatening and execution; not so properly from an obligation on God to conform the execution to the past absolute threatening, as from his obligation to conform his absolute threatening to the future execution. This God was absolutely obliged to do, as he would speak the truth. For if God absolutely threatened contrary to what he knew would come to pass, then he absolutely threatened contrary to what he knew to be truth. And how any can speak contrary to what they know to be the truth, in declaring, promising, or threatening, or any other way, consistently with perfect and inviolable truth, I cannot conceive. Threatenings are significations of something; and, if they are made consistent with truth, or are true significations of any thing, they are significations of truth, or significations of that which is true. If absolute threatening are significations of any thing, they are significations of the futurity of the thing threatened. But if the futurity of the thing threatened is not true, then how can the threatenings be true significations? And if God in them speaks contrary to what he knows, and contrary to what he intends; how he can speak true, is to me inconceivable. It is with absolute threatenings, as it is with predictions. When God has foretold something that shall come to pass hereafter, which does not concern our interest, and so is of the nature neither of a promise nor threatening, there is a necessary connexion betwixt the prediction and the fulfilment, but not by virtue of any claim we have to make; and so not properly by virtue of any obligation to fulfil, consequent on the prediction, but by virtue of an obligation on an omniscient Being in predicting, consequent on what he knew he would fulfil; an obligation to conform the prediction to the future event. It is as much against the veracity of God, absolutely to threaten what he knows he will not accomplish, as to predict what he knows he will not accomplish: for to do either, would be to declare, that that will be, which he at the same time does not intend shall be. Absolute threatenings are a sort of predictions. God in them foretells or declares what shall come to pass. They do not differ from mere predictions, in the nature of the declaration or foretelling, but partly in the thing declared or foretold, being an evil to come upon us; and a mere prediction being of a thing different; and partly in the end of foretelling. In a threatening, the end of foretelling is to deter us from sinning; and predictions of things indifferent are for some other end. Absolute threatenings are God’s declarations of something future; and the truth of God does as much oblige him to keep the truth in declarations of what is future, as of what is past or present. For things past, present, and future, are all alike before God all alike in his view. And when God declares to others what he sees himself, he is equally obliged to truth, whether the thing declared be past, present, or to come. And, indeed, there is no need of the distinction between present truth and future, in this case. For if any of God’s absolute threatenings are not to be fulfilled, those threatenings are declarations or revelations contrary, not only to future truth, but such a threatening is a revelation of the futurition of a punishment. That futurition is now present with God, when he threatens; present in his mind, his knowledge. And if be signifies that a thing is future, which he knows not to be future; then the signification he gives is contrary to present truth, even contrary to what God now knows is future. Again, an absolute threatening is a signification of the present intention of him that threatens: and therefore, if he threatens what he does not intend to fulfil, then he signifies an intention to be, which is not; and so the threatening is contrary to the present truth. God’s absolute threatenings are a revelation to his subjects, of the appointed measures of their Judge’s proceeding with respect to their breaches of his law; and if they do not reveal what is indeed the intended method of the Judge’s proceeding, then it is not a true revelation.

There is a necessity of the fulfilment of God’s absolute promises both ways; viz. both by an obligation on God to foretell or declare, or foredeclare the future benefit, according to what he foresaw would be, and be intended should be; and also by an obligation on him to fulfil his promise consequent on his predicting, and by virtue of the claim of the person to whom the promise was made.

And there is also an obligation on God to fulfil his absolute threatenings consequent on his threatenings, indirectly, by virtue of many ill and undesirable consequences of the event’s being, beside the certain dependence or certain expectations raised by God’s threatenings, in the persons threatened, and others that are spectators; which consequences God may be obliged not to be a cause of. But threatenings do not properly bring an obligation on God, that is consequent on them, as threatenings, as it is with promises.

As to those threatenings that are not positive or absolute, they are not necessarily followed with the punishment mentioned in them, because the possibility of escaping the punishment is either expressed or understood in the threatening. But the divine truth makes it necessary that there should be a certain connexion between them, that as much punishment be inflicted as is signified by them. If certain suffering be not signified by them, then there is no necessary connexion between them and certain suffering. If it be “only signified in them, that there is great danger of the suffering, according to God’s ordinary method of dealing with men, and that, therefore, they, as they would act rationally, have great reason to fear it, seeing that God does not see cause to reveal what he will do to them: if this be all that is really contained and understood in the threatening, then this is all that the threatening is connected with. Or, if the proper meaning of the threatening be, that such suffering shall come, unless they repent, and this be all that can be fairly understood, then the truth of God makes no more necessary. But God’s truth makes a necessary connexion between every threatening and every promise, and all that is properly signified in that threatening or promise.

§ 2. The satisfaction of Christ by his death is certainly a very rational thing. If any person that was greatly obliged to me, that was dependent on me, and that I loved, should exceedingly abuse me, and should go on in an obstinate course of it from one year to another, notwithstanding all I could say to him, and all new obligations continually repeated; though at length he should leave it off, I should not forgive him, unless upon gospel considerations. But if any person that was a much dearer friend to me, and one that had always been true to me, and constant to the utmost, and that was a very near relation of him that offended me, should intercede for him, and, out of the entire love he had to him, should put himself to very hard labours and difficulties, and undergo great pains and miseries to procure him forgiveness; and the person that had offended should, with a changed mind, fly to this mediator, and should seek favour in his name, with a sense in his own mind how much his mediator had done and suffered for him; I should be satisfied, and feel myself inclined, without any difficulty, to receive him into my entire friendship again; but not without the last-mentioned condition, that he should be sensible how much his mediator had done and suffered. For if be was ignorant of it, or thought he had done only some small matter, I should not be easy nor satisfied. So a sense of Christ’s sufficiency seems necessary in faith.

§ 3. The apostle when he would express his willingness to be made a sacrifice for his brethren the Jews, says, “I could wish myself accursed from Christ for my brethren:” Rom. ix. 3. See, concerning Moses, Exodus xxxii. 32. 2 Sam. xviii. 33. “O my son Absalom, my son, my son Absalom I would God I had died for thee.” This text expresses substitution; Matt. xx. 28. “To give his life a ransom for many.” Concerning this text, and the force of the preposition Greek, see Montriefs Review and Examination of the Principles of Campbell, p. 113, 114.

The laying of hands on the head of the sacrifice, was a token of putting the guilt of sin upon a person; agreeably to the customary signification of the imputation of guilt among the Hebrews. Thus the phrase, his blood shall be upon his awn head, or on our heads, &c. was a phrase for the imputation of the guilt of blood. So Joshua ii. 19. 1 Kings ii. 32, 33. “And the Lord shall return his blood upon his own head, who fell upon two men more righteous and better than he, and slew them with the sword, my father David not knowing thereof, to wit, Abner the son of Ner, captain of the host of Israel, and Amasa the son of.Tether, captain of the host of Judah. Their blood shall therefore return upon the head of Joab, and upon the head of his seed for ever; but upon David, and upon his seed, and upon his house, and upon his throne, shall there be peace for ever from the Lord.” Verse 37. “For it shall be, that on the day thou goest out and passest over the brook Kidron, thou shall know for certain that thou shall surely die; thy blood shall be upon thine own head.” Verse 44. “The king said moreover to Shimei, Thou knowest all the wickedness which thine heart is privy to, that thou didst to David my father; therefore the Lord shall return thy wickedness upon thine own head.”

Abigail, when mediating between David and Nabal, when the former was provoked to wrath against the latter, and had determined to destroy him, 1 Sam. xxv. 24. “fell at David’s feet and said, Upon me let this iniquity be, and let thy handmaid, I pray thee, speak in thy audience, and hear the voice of thy handmaid.” And in verse 28. she calls Nabal’s iniquity her iniquity. By this it appears, that a mediator’s putting himself in the stead of the offender, so that the offended party should impute the offence to him, and look on the mediator as having taken it upon him, looking on him as the debtor for what satisfaction should be required and expected, was in those days no strange notion, or considered as a thing in itself absurd and inconsistent with men’s natural notion of things.

Heb. xii. 24, 25, 26. “And to Jesus the mediator of the new covenant, and to the blood of sprinkling that speaketh better things than that of Abel. See that ye refuse not him that speaketh. For if they escaped not who refused him that spake on earth; much more shall not we escape, if we turn away from him that speaketh from heaven: whose voice then shook the earth. But now he hath promised, saying, Yet once more I shake not the earth only,” &c.

He that speaketh, whom the apostle warns us not to refuse, who spake once on earth, and whose voice shook the earth, and who now speaketh from heaven, and his voice shakes not only the earth but heaven, is he that is spoken of, verse 24. Jesus the mediator, &c. whose blood speaketh. The word Greek signifies to speak divine oracles, and in Scripture is applied to God alone. When it is said he spake on earth, respect is had to God’s giving the law at mount Sinai, when his voice shook the earth. It is plain it was not the voice of Moses, or any created angel that is intended, by the whole history of the affair in Exodus. The people made great preparation to meet with God: God descended on the mount: he was there in the midst of angels; Psalm lxviii. 17. “From his right hand went the fiery law.” Deut. xxxiii. 2. And in giving the law he says, ” I am the Lord thy God,” &c. He that in the book of Haggai ii. 6, 7. which the apostle refers to, says, “Yet once more I shake the heaven and the earth,” is God. See Owen in loc. p. 273, 274, 278.

Christ is often represented as bearing our sins for us: Isaiah liii. 4. “Surely he hath borne our griefs and carried our sorrows.” Verse 11. “For he shall near their iniquities.” Verse 12. “He bare the sin of many.” And with an evident reference to this last place, the apostle says, Heb. ix. 28. “So Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many: and to them that look for him, he shall appear the second time, without sin unto salvation.” And with a plain reference to verses 4, 5. of this 53d. chapter of Isaiah., the apostle Peter says, 1 Pet. ii. 24. “Who his ownself bare our sins in his own body on the tree.”

The word translated here in Isaiah liii. 4, and 12. is Greek the same word, and the same phrase, of bearing sin and bearing iniquity, is often used concerning things which are the types of Christ’s priesthood and sacrifice, viz. the Levitical priests and sacrifies. It was no uncommon phrase, but usual, and well understood among the Jews; and we find it very often used in other cases, and applied to others besides either Christ or the types of him. And when it is so, it is plain, that the general meaning of the phrase is, lying under the guilt of sin, having it imputed and charged upon the person, as obnoxious to the punishment of it, or obliged to answer and make satisfaction for it; or liable to the calamities and miseries to which it exposes. In such a manner it seems always to be used, unless in some few places it signifies to take away sin by forgiveness. See Dr. Owen on Heb. ix. 28. and Pool’s Synopsis on Isaiah liii. And concerning their laying their hands on the head of the sacrifice, see also Pool’s Synopsis on Levit. i. 4.

That God in the instituted ceremonies concerning the scape goat, and the other goal that was sacrificed for a sin offering, intended that there should be a representation of laying the guilt of sin on those goats; see Pool’s Synopsis on Levit. xvi. 21,. 22, 28. It was an evidence that the two goats were to appear as if they were made sinful with the sins of the people, or unclean with their uncleanness, or guilt with their guilt, that he that brought the one, and he that let go the other, were both unclean, and were therefore to wash themselves with water, &c. Levit. xvi. 26, 28.

The translation of guilt or obligation to punishment was not a thing alien from men’s conceptions and notions of old in scripture times; neither the times of the Old Testament nor New; as appears by what the woman of Tekoa says, 2 Sam. xiv. 9. “My lord, O king, the iniquity be on me and on my father’s house, and the king and his throne be guiltless.” And by what the Jews said, when Pilate said of Christ, “I am innocent of the blood of this just person, see ye to it;” Matt. xxvii. 24, 25. “His blood be on us and on our children.” And the words of Rebekah, when Jacob objected against doing as she proposed, that he should bring a curse on himself and not a blessing; Gen. xxvii. 13. “On me be thy curse, my son, only obey my voice.”

1 Cor. xv. 17. “And if Christ be not raised, your faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins,” plainly shows how necessary it was, that there should be something more than reformation, which was plainly in fact wrought, in order to their being delivered from their sins; even that atonement, the sufficiency of which God attested by raising our Great Surety from the grave.” Doddridge in loc.

Defin. 1. By merit in this discourse, I mean any thing whatsoever in any person or being, or about him or belonging to him, which appearing in the view of another is a recommendation of him to that other’s regard, esteem, or affection. I do not at present take into consideration, whether that which thus recommends be real merit, or something that truly, according to the nature of things, is worthy to induce esteem, &c.; but only what actually recommends and appears worthy in the eye of him to whom it recommends the other; which is the case of every thing that is actually the ground of respect or affection in one towards another, whether the ground be real worth, or only agreement in temper, benefits received, near relation, long acquaintance, &c. &c. Whatever it be that is by the respecting person viewed in the person respected, that actually has influence, and is effectual to recommend to respect, is merit or worthiness of respect or fitness for it in his eyes.

Defin. 2. By patron, I mean a person of superior dignity or merit, that stands for and espouses the interest of another, interposes between him and a third person or party, in that capacity to maintain, secure, or promote the interest of that other, by his influence with the third person, improving his merit with him, or interest in his esteem and regard for that end. And by client, I mean that other person whose interest the patron thus espouses, and in this manner endeavours to maintain and promote.

Having explained how I use these terms, I would now observe the following things:

1. It is not unreasonable or against nature, or without foundation in the reason and nature of things, that respect should be shown to one on account of his relation to, or union and connexion with, another: or, which is the same thing, that a person should be thought the proper object of respect or regard, viewed in that relation or connexion, which he is not the proper object of, viewed as by himself singly and separately: or, which is still the same thing, that a person should be thought worthy of respect, or meriting respect, on the account of the merit of the other person whom he stands related to, which he would not merit viewed by himself, taking the word Here as it has been explained.

2. Whenever one is thus viewed, as having a merit of respect on the account of the merit of another that he stands related to, who has not that merit considered by himself, the merit of the person he is related to is imputed to him; and these persons so far are substituted the one in the place of the other. This is plain: for the person now accepted as having merit of respect, has not that merit in himself considered alone, but only as related to another that has merit in himself, and so is respected for the sake of the merit of that other; which is the very same thing as, in our view or consideration, transferring that merit from that other person to him, and viewing it in him as his merit, or merit that he is interested in, merit whose recommending influence becomes his in some degree; so that in all such cases here is an imputation and substitution in some degree. The merit of the one becomes the merit of the other in some degree; or, in other words, the recommending property, virtue, and influence of the one, becomes the recommending influence of the other, or influence that prevails to recommend the other; which is the same thing. Thus it is, when any one respects a near relation, or a child, or the spouse of a friend that is very dear and greatly esteemed for such a friend’s sake, or shows the relative or friend greater regard, seeks his welfare more, and shows him more kindness, than he would do if he were viewed out of such a relation or connexion, and entirely by himself.

Thus it is reasonable and natural, that one should be respected for the merit of another, and so his merit be in some degree imputed to another, and one person be substituted for another according to the natural sense of all mankind.

3. As it is the relation of one to another, or his union with him, that is the ground of the respect that is shown towards him for the other’s sake, and so the ground of substitution of the other in his stead, and of the imputation of the other’s merit in some degree, as has been observed; so it is manifest, that the greater or nearer that relation is, and the stricter the union, so much the more does it prevail for the acceptance of the person, or the object of respect, for the sake of him to whom he is united; or, in other words, the union, by how much greater and closer it is, by so much more it is a ground of his being accepted, as if he were one with the other, or of the other’s being substituted for him, and his merit’s being imputed in a greater degree, and more, as if he were the same.

4. If there be any such thing as a union of a person to another, as, for instance, a patron to a client, in such a certain degree, or in such a manner, as that, on the account of the degree and manner, it shall he peculiarly fit to look upon them as completely one and the same, as to all that concerns the interest of the client, with relation to the regard of the friend of the patron; then especially may the patron be taken by his friend as the substitute of the client, and his merit be imputed to him.

If it be inquired, what degree or manner of union may be looked upon thus complete: I answer, When the patron’s heart is so united to the client, that when the client is to be destroyed, he, from love, is willing to take his destruction on himself, or what is equivalent thereto, so that the client may escape; then he may be properly accepted as perfectly one with regard to the interest of the client; for this reason, that his love to the client is such as thoroughly puts him into the place of the client in all that concerns his interest, even so as to absorb or swallow up his whole interest: because his love actually puts him in the room of the beloved, in that suffering or calamity which, being his total destruction, does swallow up and consume all his interest, without leaving the least part of it. Therefore, love that will take that destruction, evidently takes in his whole interest. It appears to be an equal balance for it. His love puts him thoroughly in his client’s stead. If his love were such as made him willing to put himself in the other’s stead, in many cases where his interest was concerned, but yet not in a case where all is concerned, the union is not complete; he is partially, and not thoroughly, united. But when the love of the patron is such as to go through with the matter, and makes him willing to put himself in the other’s stead, even in the case of the last extremity, and where the beloved is to be utterly and perfectly destroyed; then he is, as to his love, sufficiently united, so as to be accepted as completely one by his friend, in all that concerns the client’s welfare.

5. If a friend that is very dear to any person, and of great merit in the eyes of any person, not only stands in a strict union with another, but also does particularly express a great desire of that other’s welfare, and appears much to seek it; it is agreeable to nature, that the welfare of the person united to him should be regarded for his sake, and on his account, as if it were his own welfare. For, by means of this desire of the other’s welfare, his welfare becomes his own. For that good which any one desires, sets his heart upon, and seeks, thereby becomes his own good: it becomes a good that is grateful to him, or which tends to gratify and delight him: for it is grateful to all to have their desires gratified.

In such a case, the dear and worthy person makes the other’s interest his own by his explicit choice; by his own act he places his interest in the interest of the other, and so substitutes himself in the other’s stead, as to the affair of interest or welfare.