Section LXXVIII. The Inner Revelation and the Conscience. (Concl'd) · SECTION CXXXI.

The end of moral action, as willed by man as moral, is identical with the end of God in man’s creation; in this action man wills perfectly to realize in himself the image of God,—to develop himself in reality as a good being, and thereby to realize the good in general. In so far as the good is a fruit of moral action, it is not a something exterior to man, but inheres in him,—is his possession, which, as incorporated into the morally-formed essence of man himself, and as thenceforth inseparable from him, is a property or quality of his person. In so far as the good is the property of man, it is his moral estate. Hence, as the end of the moral activity in general is the good, so is this end, for the moral man himself; the good as having become a moral estate.

The world is, with its mere creation, not as yet complete, but is charged with a task which is to be carried out by moral creatures themselves. Though it is true that all good is from God, still all good is not from Him immediately; but in man’s case it arises through the free developing of that which was directly created. Man is himself to create good; though as a creature he is good, yet he is not good in such a manner as he is to become so; the image of God becomes complete in him only through his own moral activity; and he makes into a good entity not only himself, but also the world that comes into contact with him,—he creates a spiritual historical world which is itself good. To this good as created by himself he sustains quite other relations than to that which is directly given to him in his natural existence. To the first man much good was given, to which he had a right, and which he could call his own. This good, however, was simply placed upon him,—was as yet external to him, and not as yet identified with his spiritual being; he indeed possessed it, but it was not yet his property,—was not a quality of his. All that I have in my power, upon which I have an actual claim, is my possession. But the idea of property is higher; only that is my property which by moral action I have appropriated to myself, and which consequently essentially belongs to my personal life-sphere, as my free personal acquisition. A merely inherited property or power is morally a mere possession, while an estate or power that is acquired by labor or is morally developed, is a property; in it I have invested my labor, my soul, my will,—it inheres in me and in my self-created life-sphere,—is my enlarged personality itself. Hence property has always a moral element in it,—is moral fruit, is an acquisition. In the case of the first human beings, the possession of Eden would have become a property, only in virtue of their cultivating and caring for it. A moral property is inalienable; it may, as, for example, in the case of a work of art, come into the possession of another, but it remains the spiritual property of its author. A slave is the possession of his master; but consorts not only possess each other,—they appertain to each other,—each is the property of the other. Thus in so far as the good becomes and is a property, it is a good, a moral estate,—and hence it is such only as a fruit of moral action. The good as an outward possession may be lost; but when exalted into a moral property, it is permanent; to this Christ alludes when he says: “Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth,” etc. [Matt. vi, 19, 20].