Article. 2 - Whether predestination places anything in the predestined?

Objection 1: It seems that does place something in the . For every action of itself causes passion. If therefore is action in God, must be passion in the .

Objection 2: Further, Origen says on the text, "He who was ," etc. (Rom. 1:4): " is of one who is not; destination, of one who is." And Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.): "What is but the destination of one who is?" Therefore is only of one who actually exists; and it thus places something in the .

Objection 3: Further, preparation is something in the thing prepared. But is the preparation of God's benefits, as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14). Therefore is something in the .

Objection 4: Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition of eternity. But , which is something temporal, is found in the definition of . For is the preparation of in the present; and of glory in the future. Therefore is not anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is in the , and not in God; for whatever is in Him is eternal.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that " is the foreknowledge of God's benefits." But foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who foreknows them. Therefore, is in the one who predestines, and not in the .

I answer that, is not anything in the ; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that is a part of . Now is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider, as was proved above (Q[22], A[1]). But the execution of which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active way in the governor. it is clear that is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the , but actively in God. The execution of is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle (Rom. 8:30): "Whom He , them He also called and whom He called, them He also magnified [Vulg. '']."

Reply to Objection 1: Actions passing out to external matter imply of themselves passion---for example, the actions of warming and cutting; but not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and willing, as said above (Q[14], A[2]; Q[18], A[3], ad 1). is an action of this latter class. , it does not put anything in the . But its execution, which passes out to external things, has an effect in them.

Reply to Objection 2: Destination sometimes denotes a real mission of someone to a given end; thus, destination can only be said of someone actually existing. It is taken, however, in another sense for a mission which a person conceives in the mind; and in this manner we are said to destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In this latter way it is said that Eleazar "determined not to do any unlawful things for the love of life" (2 Macc. 6:20). Thus destination can be of a thing which does not exist. , however, by reason of the antecedent nature it implies, can be attributed to a thing which does not actually exist; in whatsoever way destination is accepted.

Reply to Objection 3: Preparation is twofold: of the patient in respect to passion and this is in the thing prepared; and of the agent to action, and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is , and as an agent by intellect is said to prepare itself to act, accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to be done. Thus, God from all eternity prepared by , conceiving the idea of the order of some towards salvation.

Reply to Objection 4: does not come into the definition of , as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch as implies a relation to , as of cause to effect, and of act to its object. it does not follow that is anything temporal.