John Owen · 21 of 45

Chapter VIII. Imputation of the sins of the church unto Christ. Grounds of it. The nature of his suretiship. Causes of the new covenant. Christ and the church one mystical person. Consequents thereof. · Part 3

(3.) The assignation of the sole end, of the death of Christ to be the procurement of the new covenant, in the sense contended for, does indeed evacuate all the virtue of the death of Christ and of the covenant itself; for, — First, The covenant which they intend is nothing but the constitution and proposal of new terms and conditions for life and salvation unto all men. Now, whereas the acceptance and accomplishment of these conditions depend upon the wills of men no way determined by effectual grace, it was possible that, notwithstanding all Christ did by his death, yet no one sinner might be saved thereby, but that the whole end and design of God therein might be frustrated. Secondly, Whereas the substantial advantage of these conditions lies herein, that God will now, for the sake of Christ, accept of an obedience inferior unto that required in the law, and so as that the grace of Christ does not raise up all things unto a conformity and compliance with the holiness and will of God declared therein, but accommodate all things unto our present condition, nothing can be invented more dishonourable to Christ and the gospel; for what does it else but make Christ the minister of sin, in disannulling the holiness that the law requires, or the obligation of the law unto it, without any provision of what might answer or come into the room of it, but that which is incomparably less worthy? Nor is it consistent with divine wisdom, goodness, and immutability, to appoint unto mankind a law of obedience, and cast them all under the severest penalty upon the transgression of it, when he could in justice and honour have given them such a law of obedience, whose observance might consist with many failings and sins; for if he have done that now, he could have done so before: which how far it reflects on the glory of the divine properties might be easily manifested. Neither does this fond imagination comply with those testimonies of Scripture, that the Lord Christ came not to destroy the law, but to fulfil it, that he is the end of the law; and that by faith the law is not disannulled, but established. Lastly, The Lord Christ was the mediator and surety of the new covenant, in and by whom it was ratified, confirmed, and established: and therefore by him the constitution of it was not procured; for all the acts of his office belong unto that mediation, and it cannot be well apprehended how any act of mediation for the establishment of the covenant, and rendering it effectual, should procure it.

7. But to return from this digression. That wherein all the precedent causes of the union between Christ and believers, whence they become one mystical person, do centre, and whereby they are rendered a complete foundation of the imputation of their sins unto him, and of his righteousness unto them, is the communication of his Spirit, the same Spirit that dwells in him, unto them, to abide in, to animate and guide, the whole mystical body and all its members. But this has of late been so much spoken unto, as that I shall do no more but mention it.

On the considerations insisted on, — whereby the Lord Christ became one mystical person with the church, or bare the person of the church in what he did as mediator, in the holy, wise disposal of God as the author of the law, the supreme rector or governor of all mankind, as unto their temporal and eternal concernments, and by his own consent, — the sins of all the elect were imputed unto him. Thus having been the faith and language of the church in all ages, and that derived from and founded on express testimonies of Scripture, with all the promises and resignations of his exhibition in the flesh from the beginning, cannot now, with any modesty, be expressly denied. Wherefore the Socinians themselves grant that our sins may be said to be imputed unto Christ, and he to undergo the punishment of them, so far as that all things which befell him evil and afflictive in this life, with the death which he underwent, were occasioned by our sins; for had not we sinned, there had been no need of nor occasion for his suffering. But notwithstanding this concession, they expressly deny his satisfaction, or that properly he underwent the punishment due unto our sins; wherein they deny also all imputation of them unto him. Others say that our sins were imputed unto him “quoad reatum pœnæ,” but not “quoad reatum culpæ.” But I must acknowledge that unto me this distinction gives “inanem sine mente sonum.” The substance of it is much insisted on by Feuardentius, Dialog v. p. 467; and he is followed by others. That which he would prove by it is, that the Lord Christ did not present himself before the throne of God with the burden of our sins upon him, so as to answer unto the justice of God for them. Whereas, therefore, “reatus,” or “guilt,” may signify either “dignitatem pœnæ,” or “obligationem ad pœnam,” as Bellarmine distinguishes. De Amiss. Grat., lib. vii. cap. 7, with respect unto Christ the latter only is to be admitted. And the main argument he and others insist upon is this, — that if our sins be imputed unto Christ, as unto the guilt of the fault, as they speak, then he must be polluted with them, and thence be denominated a sinner in every kind. And this would be true, if our sins could be communicated unto Christ by transfusion, so as to be his inherently and subjectively; but their being so only by imputation gives no countenance unto any such pretence. However, there is a notion of legal uncleanness, where there is no inherent defilement; so the priest who offered the red heifer to make atonement, and he that burned her, were said to be unclean, Numb. xix. 7, 8. But hereon they say, that Christ died and suffered upon the special command of God, not that his death and suffering were any way due upon the account of our sins, or required in justice; which is utterly to overthrow the satisfaction of Christ.

Wherefore, the design of this distinction is, to deny the imputation of the guilt of our sins unto Christ; and then in what tolerable sense can they be said to be imputed unto him, I cannot understand. But we are not tied up unto arbitrary distinctions, and the sense that any are pleased to impose on the terms of them. I shall, therefore, first inquire into the meaning of these words, guilt and guilty, whereby we may be able to judge what it is which in this distinction is intended.

The Hebrews have no other word to signify guilt or guilty but אָשָׁם; and this they use both for sin, the guilt of it, the punishment due unto it, and a sacrifice for it. Speaking of the guilt of blood, they use not any word to signify guilt, but only say, דָּם לוֹ — “It is blood to him.” So David prays, “Deliver me” מִדָּמִים, “from blood;” which we render “blood-guiltiness,” Ps. li. 14. And this was because, by the constitution of God, he that was guilty of blood was to die by the hand of the magistrate, or of God himself. But אָשָׁם (ascham) is nowhere used for guilt, but it signifies the relation of the sin intended unto punishment. And other significations of it will be in vain sought for in the Old Testament.

In the New Testament he that is guilty is said to be ὑπόδικος, Rom. iii. 19; that is, obnoxious to judgment or vengeance for sin, one that ἡ δίκη ζῇν οὐκ εἴασεν, as they speak, Acts xxviii. 4, “whom vengeance will not suffer to go unpunished;” — and ἔνοχος, 1 Cor. xi. 27, a word of the same signification; — once by ὀφείλω, Matt. xxiii. 18, to owe, to be indebted to justice. To be obnoxious, liable unto justice, vengeance, punishment for sin, is to be guilty.

“Reus,” “guilty,” in the Latin is of a large signification. He who is “crimini obnoxious,” or “pœnæ propter crimen,” or “voti debitor,” or “promissi,” or “officii ex sponsione,” is called “reus.” Especially every sponsor or surety is “reus” in the law. “Cum servus pecuniam pro libertate pactus est, et ob eam rem, reum dederit,” (that is, “sponsorem, expromissorem,”) “quamvis servus ab alio manusmissus est, reus tamen obligabitur.” He is “reus,” who engages himself for any other, as to the matter of his engagement; and the same is the use of the word in the best Latin authors. “Opportuna loca dividenda præfectis esse ac suæ quique partis tutandæ reus sit,” Liv. De Bello Punic. lib. v. 30; — that every captain should so take care of the station committed to him, as that if any thing happened amiss it should be imputed unto him. And the same author again, “An, quicunque aut propinquitate, aut affinitate, regiam aut aliquibus ministeriis contigissent, alienæ culpæ rei trucidarentur,” B. P., lib. iv. 22; — should be guilty of the fault of another (by imputation), and suffer for it. So that in the Latin tongue he is “reus,” who, for himself or any other, is obnoxious unto punishment or payment.

“Reatus” is a word of late admission into the Latin tongue, and was formed of “reus.” So Quintilian informs us, in his discourse of the use of obsolete and new words, lib. viii., cap. 3, “Quæ vetera nunc sunt, fuerunt olim nova, et quædam in usu perquam recentia; ut, Messala primus reatum, munerarium Augustus primus, dixerat;” — to which he adds “piratica, musica,” and some others, then newly come into use: but “reatus” at its first invention was of no such signification as it is now applied unto. I mention it only to show that we have no reason to be obliged unto men’s arbitrary use of words. Some lawyers first used it “pro crimine,” — a fault exposing unto punishment; but the original invention of it, confirmed by long use, was to express the outward state and condition of him who was “reus,” after he was first charged in a cause criminal, before he was acquitted or condemned. Those among the Romans who were made “rei” by any public accusation did betake themselves unto a poor squalid habit, a sorrowful countenance, suffering their hair and beards to go undressed. Hereby, on custom and usage, the people who were to judge on their cause were inclined to compassion: and Milo furthered his sentence of banishment because he would not submit to this custom, which had such an appearance of pusillanimity and baseness of spirit. This state of sorrow and trouble, so expressed, they called “reatus,” and nothing else. It came afterwards to denote their state who were committed unto custody in order unto their trial, when the government ceased to be popular; wherein alone the other artifice was of use: and if this word be of any use in our present argument, it is to express the state of men after conviction of sin, before their justification. That is their “reatus,” the condition wherein the proudest of them cannot avoid to express their inward sorrow and anxiety of mind by some outward evidences of them. Beyond this we are not obliged by the use of this word, but must consider the thing itself which now we intend to express thereby.

Guilt, in the Scripture, is the respect of sin unto the sanction of the law, whereby the sinner becomes obnoxious unto punishment; and to be guilty is to be ὑπόδικος τῷ Θεῷ· — liable unto punishment for sin from God, as the supreme lawgiver and judge of all. And so guilt, or “reatus,” is well defined to be “obligatio ad pœnam, propter culpam, aut admissam in se, aut imputatum, justè aut injustè;” for so Bathsheba says unto David, that she and her son Solomon should be חַטָּאִים, — sinners; that is, be esteemed guilty, or liable unto punishment for some evil laid unto their charge, 1 Kings i. 21. And the distinction of “dignitas pœnæ,” and “obligatio ad pœnam” is but the same thing in diverse words; for both do but express the relation of sin unto the sanction of the law: or if they may be conceived to differ, yet are they inseparable; for there can be no “obligatio ad pœnam” where there is not “dignitas pœnæ.”

Much less is there any thing of weight in the distinction of “reatus culpæ” and “reatus pœnæ;” for this “reatus culpæ” is nothing but “dignitas pœnæ propter culpam.” Sin has other considerations, — namely, its formal nature, as it is a transgression of the law, and the stain of filth that it brings upon the soul; but the guilt of it is nothing but its respect unto punishment from the sanction of the law. And so, indeed, “reatus culpæ” is “reatus pœnæ,” — the guilt of sin is its desert of punishment. And where there is not this “reatus culpæ” there can be no “pœnæ,” no punishment properly so called; for “pœnæ” is “vindicta noxæ,” — the revenge due to sin. So, therefore, there can be no punishment, nor “reatus pœnæ,” the guilt of it, but where there is “reatus culpæ,” or sin considered with its guilt; and the “reatus pœnæ” that may be supposed without the guilt of sin, is nothing but that obnoxiousness unto afflictive evil on the occasion of sin which the Socinians admit with respect unto the suffering of Christ, and yet execrate his satisfaction.

And if this distinction should be apprehended to be of “reatus,” from its formal respect unto sin and punishment, it must, in both parts of the distinction, be of the same signification, otherwise there is an equivocation in the subject of it. But “reatus pœnæ,” is a liableness, an obnoxiousness unto punishment according to the sentence of the law, that whereby a sinner becomes ὑπόδικος τῷ Θεῷ· and then “reatus culpæ” must be an obnoxiousness unto sin; which is uncouth. There is, therefore, no imputation of sin where there is no imputation of its guilt; for the guilt of punishment, which is not its respect unto the desert of sin, is a plain fiction, — there is no such thing “in rerum nature.” There is no guilt of sin, but in its relation unto punishment.

That, therefore, which we affirm herein is, that our sins were so transferred on Christ, as that thereby he became אָשֵׁם, ὑπόδικος τῷ Θεῷ, “reus,” — responsible unto God, and obnoxious unto punishment in the justice of God for them. He was “alienæ culpæ reus,” — perfectly innocent in himself; but took our guilt on him, or our obnoxiousness unto punishment for sin. And so he may be, and may be said to be, the greatest debtor in the world, who never borrowed nor owed one farthing on his own account, if he become surety for the greatest debt of others: so Paul became a debtor unto Philemon, upon his undertaking for Onesimus, who before owed him nothing.

And two things concurred unto this imputation of sin unto Christ, — First, The act of God imputing it. Second, The voluntary act of Christ himself in the undertaking of it, or admitting of the charge.

(1.) The act of God, in this imputation of the guilt of our sins unto Christ, is expressed by his “laying all our iniquities upon him,” “making him to be sin for us, who knew no sin,” and the like. For, — [1.] As the supreme governor, lawgiver, and judge of all, unto whom it belonged to take care that his holy law was observed, or the offenders punished, he admitted, upon the transgression of it, the sponsion and suretiship of Christ to answer for the sins of men, Heb. x. 5–7. [2.] In order unto this end, he made him under the law, or gave the law power over him, to demand of him and inflict on him the penalty which was due unto the sins of them for whom he undertook, Gal. iii. 13; iv. 4, 5. [3.] For the declaration of the righteousness of God in this setting forth of Christ to be a propitiation, and to bear our iniquities, the guilt of our sins was transferred unto him in an act of the righteous judgment of God accepting and esteeming of him as the guilty person; as it is with public sureties in every case.

(2.) The Lord Christ’s voluntary susception of the state and condition of a surety, or undertaker for the church, to appear before the throne of God’s justice for them, to answer whatever was laid unto their charge, was required hereunto; and this he did absolutely. There was a concurrence of his own will in and unto all those divine acts whereby he and the church were constituted one mystical person; and of his own love and grace did he as our surety stand in our stead before God, when he made inquisition for sin; — he took it on himself, as unto the punishment which it deserved. Hence it became just and righteous that he should suffer, “the just for the unjust, that he might bring us unto God.”

For if this be not so, I desire to know what is become of the guilt of the sins of believers; if it were not transferred on Christ, it remains still upon themselves, or it is nothing. It will be said that guilt is taken away by the free pardon of sin. But if so, there was no need of punishment for it at all, — which is, indeed, what the Socinians plead, but by others is not admitted, — for if punishment be not for guilt, it is not punishment.

But it is fiercely objected against what we have asserted, that if the guilt of our sins was imputed unto Christ, then was he constituted a sinner thereby; for it is the guilt of sin that makes any one to be truly a sinner. This is urged by Bellarmine, lib. ii., De Justificat., not for its own sake, but to disprove the imputation of his righteousness unto us; as it is continued by others with the same design. For says he, “If we be made righteous, and the children of God, through the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, then was he made a sinner, ‘et quod horret animus cogitare, filius diaboli;’ by the imputation of the guilt of our sins or our unrighteousness unto him.” And the same objection is pressed by others, with instances of consequences which, for many reasons, I heartily wish had been forborne. But I answer, —

[1.] Nothing is more absolutely true, nothing is more sacredly or assuredly believed by us, than that nothing which Christ did or suffered, nothing that he undertook or underwent, did or could constitute him subjectively, inherently, and thereon personally, a sinner, or guilty of any sin of his own. To bear the guilt or blame of other men’s faults, — to be “alienæ culpæ reus,” — makes no man a sinner, unless he did unwisely or irregularly undertake it. But that Christ should admit of any thing of sin in himself, as it is absolutely inconsistent with the hypostatical union, so it would render him unmet for all other duties of his office, Heb. vii. 25, 26. And I confess it has always seemed scandalous unto me, that Socinus, Crellius, and Grotius, do grant that, in some sense, Christ suffered for his own sins, and would prove it from that very place wherein it is positively denied, chap. vii. 27. This ought to be sacredly fixed and not a word used, nor thought entertained, of any possibility of the contrary, upon any supposition whatever.

[2.] None ever dreamed of a transfusion or propagation of sin from us unto Christ, such as there was from Adam unto us. For Adam was a common person unto us, — we are not so to Christ: yea, he is so to us; and the imputation of our sins unto him is a singular act of divine dispensation, which no evil consequence can ensue upon.

[3.] To imagine such an imputation of our sins unto Christ as that thereon they should cease to be our sins, and become his absolutely, is to overthrow that which is affirmed; for, on that supposition, Christ could not suffer for our sins, for they ceased to be ours antecedently unto his suffering. But the guilt of them was so transferred unto him, that through his suffering for it, it might be pardoned unto us.

These things being premised, I say, —

First, There is in sin a transgression of the preceptive part of the law; and there is an obnoxiousness unto the punishment from the sanction of it. It is the first that gives sin its formal nature; and where that is not subjectively, no person can be constituted formally a sinner. However any one may be so denominated, as unto some certain end or purpose, yet, without this, formally a sinner none can be, whatever be imputed unto them. And where that is, no non-imputation of sin, as unto punishment, can free the person in whom it is from being formally a sinner. When Bathsheba told David that she and her son Solomon should be חַטָּאִים (sinners), by having crimes laid unto their charge; and when Judah told Jacob that he would be a sinner before him always on the account of any evil that befell Benjamin (it should be imputed unto him); yet neither of them could thereby be constituted a sinner formally. And, on the other hand, when Shimei desired David not to impute sin unto him, whereby he escaped present punishment, yet did not that non-imputation free him formally from being a sinner. Wherefore sin, under this consideration, as a transgression of the preceptive part of the law, cannot be communicated from one unto another, unless it be by the propagation of a vitiated principle or habit. But yet neither so will the personal sin of one, as inherent in him, ever come to be the personal sin of another. Adam has upon his personal sin communicated a vicious, depraved, and corrupted nature unto all his posterity; and, besides, the guilt of his actual sin is imputed unto them, as if it had been committed by every one of them: but yet his particular personal sin neither ever did, nor ever could, become the personal sin of any one of them any otherwise than by the imputation of its guilt unto them. Wherefore our sins neither are, nor can be, so imputed unto Christ, as that they should become subjectively his, as they are a transgression of the preceptive part of the law. A physical translation or transfusion of sin is, in this case, naturally and spiritually impossible; and yet, on a supposition thereof alone do the horrid consequences mentioned depend. But the guilt of sin is an external respect of it, with regard unto the sanction of the law only. This is separable from sin; and if it were not so, no one sinner could either be pardoned or saved. It may, therefore, be made another’s by imputation, and yet that other not rendered formally a sinner thereby. This was that which was imputed unto Christ, whereby he was rendered obnoxious unto the curse of the law; for it was impossible that the law should pronounce any accursed but the guilty, nor would do so, Deut. xxvii. 26.

Secondly, There is a great difference between the imputation of the righteousness of Christ unto us and the imputation of our sins unto Christ; so as that he cannot in the same manner be said to be made a sinner by the one as we are made righteous by the other. For our sin was imputed unto Christ only as he was our surety for a time, — to this end, that he might take it away, destroy it, and abolish it. It was never imputed unto him, so as to make any alteration absolutely in his personal state and condition. But his righteousness is imputed unto us to abide with us, to be ours always, and to make a total change in our state and condition, as unto our relation unto God. Our sin was imputed unto him only for a season, not absolutely, but as he was a surety, and unto the special end of destroying it; and taken on him on this condition, that his righteousness should be made ours for ever. All things are otherwise in the imputation of his righteousness unto us, which respects us absolutely, and not under a temporary capacity, abides with us for ever, changes our state and relation unto God, and is an effect of superabounding grace.

But it will be said that if our sins, as to the guilt of them, were imputed unto Christ, then God must hate Christ; for he hates the guilty. I know not well how I come to mention these things, which indeed I look upon as cavils, such as men may multiply if they please against any part of the mysteries of the gospel. But seeing it is mentioned, it may be spoken unto; and, —

First, It is certain that the Lord Christ’s taking on him the guilt of our sins was a high act of obedience unto God, Heb. x. 5, 6; and for which the “Father loved him,” John x. 17, 18. There was, therefore, no reason why God should hate Christ for his taking on him our debt, and the payment of it, in an act of the highest obedience unto his will. Secondly, God in this matter is considered as a rector, ruler, and judge. Now, it is not required of the severest judge, that, as a judge, he should hate the guilty person, no, although he be guilty originally by inhesion, and not by imputation. As such, he has no more to do but consider the guilt, and pronounce the sentence of punishment. But, Thirdly, Suppose a person, out of an heroic generosity of mind, should become an Ἀντίψυχος for another, for his friend, for a good man, so as to answer for him with his life, as Judah undertook to be for Benjamin as to his liberty, — which, when a man has lost, he is civilly dead, and “capite diminutus,” — would the most cruel tyrant under heaven, that should take away his life, in that case hate him? would he not rather admire his worth and virtue? As such a one it was that Christ suffered, and no otherwise. Fourthly, All the force of this exception depends on the ambiguity of the word hate; for it may signify either an aversation or detestation of mind, or only a will of punishing, as in God mostly it does. In the first sense, there was no ground why God should hate Christ on this imputation of guilt unto him, whereby he became “non propriæ sed alienæ culpæ reus.” Sin inherent renders the soul polluted, abominable, and the only object of divine aversation; but for him who was perfectly innocent, holy, harmless, undefiled in himself, who did no sin, neither was there guile found in his mouth, to take upon him the guilt of other sins, thereby to comply with and accomplish the design of God for the manifestation of his glory and infinite wisdom, grace, goodness, mercy, and righteousness, unto the certain expiation and destruction of sin, — nothing could render him more glorious and lovely in the sight of God or man. But for a will of punishing in God, where sin is imputed, none can deny it, but they must therewithal openly disavow the satisfaction of Christ.

The heads of some few of those arguments wherewith the truth we have asserted is confirmed shall close this discourse:—

1. Unless the guilt of sin was imputed unto Christ, sin was not imputed unto him in any sense, for the punishment of sin is not sin; nor can those who are otherwise minded declare what it is of sin that is imputed. But the Scripture is plain, that “God laid on him the iniquity of us all,” and “made him to be sin for us;” which could not otherwise be but by imputation.

2. There can be no punishment but with respect unto the guilt of sin personally contracted or imputed. It is guilt alone that gives what is materially evil and afflictive the formal nature of punishment, and nothing else. And therefore those who understand full well the harmony of things and opinions, and are free to express their minds, do constantly declare that if one of these be denied, the other must be so also; and if one be admitted, they must both be so. If guilt was not imputed unto Christ, he could not, as they plead well enough, undergo the punishment of sin; much he might do and suffer on the occasion of sin, but undergo the punishment due unto sin he could not. And if it should be granted that the guilt of sin was imputed unto him, they will not deny but that he underwent the punishment of it; and if he underwent the punishment of it, they will not deny but that the guilt of it was imputed unto him; for these things are inseparably related.

3. Christ was made a curse for us, the curse of the law, as is expressly declared, Gal. iii. 13, 14. But the curse of the law respects the guilt of sin only; so as that where that is not, it cannot take place in any sense, and where that is, it does inseparably attend it, Deut. xxvii. 26.